The search without end; proof, and error the path of science.

The human being in his infinite curiosity has always sought the truth, always wanted to know the laws of life and/or reality. But how close have come to this? Science, in its broadest definition, is a body of knowledge that seeks to understand, describe and explain reality using reproducible methods (Garcia, 2015). Science is the tool for which we approach reality. But this tool needs a criterion of demarcation, with which it is tried to define the limits that configure it and with which it is possible to be decided between two given theories. Popper (1972) raises the criterion of falsifiability, in which he says that a conjecture belongs to empirical science if and only if it is falsifiable. A hypothesis is falsifiable if there is an observational statement or a set of observations that are incompatible. Then the statements made in science should be based on observations in order to demonstrate the falsifiability of a theory through the results of observation and experimentation. But why should we demonstrate the falsifiability and not the veracity of the theories? Given that we do not know the absolute truth, that we cannot justify a statement as true and that work in science is a constant approach to the truth, of course without knowing it, it is more logical to look for potential falsifiers than to try to fit empirical evidence to the moment model. Since the purpose of science is to produce theories that are as close to the truth as possible, this degree of approach is achieved by testing theories in experience and contrasting theories about the same subject. A well-corroborated theory can be used as an indicator of its degree of nearness to the truth, for example, if I have two theories and one has endured proofs in which the other fails could be said that the first is closer to the truth (Popper, 1972). then it is considered corroborated, being able to be accepted provisionally, but not verified; that is, no theory is absolutely true, if not provisionally corroborated by empirical evidence (Garcia, 2015).

Kuhn (2001) says that the demarcation criterion of Popper is wrong because for this author science is divided into two; normal science and extraordinary science. Normal science is the activity of non-revolutionary professionals, those who accept a paradigm and work around it and extraordinary science is when there is a series of phenomena that do not conform to existing paradigms and that despite several hypotheses are formulated ad In order to frame them remain confused within the paradigm, Kuhn accuses Popper that his criterion does not recognize normal science and only focuses on extraordinary science but this is not true, Popper believes that there is no division of science and that the "Normal science" is carried out by those scientists who do not investigate or challenge the dogma, it is in disagreement with Kuhn and his affirmation "the failures do not reject the theories altogether, it suffices to introduce ad hoc hypothesis" (Jaramillo and Aguirre,  2004).

Lakatos (1970) says: "If all scientific statements are fallible theories, you can criticize only for inconsistency. But then, in what sense, if there is any, is science empirical? If the scientific theories are neither probable, nor probability, nor refutable, then it seems that the skeptic is finally right: science is nothing more than vain speculation and there is no such thing as progress in scientific knowledge ".

It is true that the development of science is based on previous knowledge but Popper is right when he states that science is generally fallible and the most accepted theories today can be false since they are conjectures that may or may not be true and we can not know that a theory is true, even if it is "(Popper, 1962). If we do not know the truth, but we know that our explanation does not adjust with some phenomena then we could deduce that our explanation is not correct, we should look for another explanation instead of trying to adjust our evidence or empirical knowledge to a theory. And that's how science works, trial and error.

Progress in scientific knowledge is not measured as a number of successes but as a gain in the evaluated explanations, that is, instead of having the true explanation we have ruled out an explanation, it would be like reducing the space of possible explanations in the style of the Detective Sherlock Holmes. Science will always be subject to changes, otherwise, it would have sense? Science is based on looking for an explanation of what we do not know, always researchers from previous knowledge ask questions about some phenomenon, always the questions are about what we do not understand if the progress in scientific knowledge was to obtain the truth Absolute would be enough to pose a universal explanation, accept it and pose a new problem. But no, in science there is no absolute truth, there are theories that are evaluated that corroborate or falsify, there is no true statement but the explanation that best fits are the theory most accepted at the time. if not, the earth would still be flat.

Bibliography:

• García Duque, C.E. “El realismo científico de Karl Popper, tan coherentes cómo es posible”. Discusiones Filosóficas. Jul.-Dic. 2015: 63-86. DOI: 10.17151/difil.2015.16.27.5.

• Jaramillo, L. y Aguirre, J. 2004. La controversia Kuhn – Popper en torno al progreso científico y sus posibles aportes a la enseñanza de las ciencias Cinta moebio 20: 83-92.

• Kuhn, T.S. La estructura de las revoluciones científicas. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2001.

• Lakatos, I. “Falsification and the methodology of Scientific Research Programmes.” Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge. Eds. I. Lakatos and A. Musgrave. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1970. Print.

• Popper, K. Conjectures and Refutations. The Growth of Scientific Knowledge. New York: Basic Books, 1962. Print.

• Popper, K. Objective Knowledge. An evolutionary Approach. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1972. Print.

• Popper, K. Realism and the Aim of Science. Post Scriptum to the Logic of Scientific Discovery. London: Hutchison, 1983. Print.