domingo, 4 de marzo de 2007

Defensa a Popper

‘Science does not aim, primarily, at high probabilities. It aims at a high informative content, well backed by experience. But a hypothesis may be probable simply because it tells us nothing, or very little’ (Popper, 1954).

The inductivism is a logic impossible, just because from observational facts, can not being infer theories. The theories are product of a mental process in which we conjecture about reality. Additionally, is technically impossible to observe the entire Phenomena’s events, because is preferable to look for those events (tests) that falsify the theory.

Popper proposed that the truth content of the theories, even the best of them, cannot be verified by scientific testing, but can only be falsified or corroborated. The knowledge is the result of conjectures (response to a given problem situation) which are systematically subjected to the most rigorous attempts at falsification possible. The conjectures that pass the process of refutation are not more true, but rather, more corroborated and then more applicable to the problem situation at hand. This applicability does not predict continued corroboration; neither does rigorous testing protect a conjecture from refutation in the future. So we can never know in fact when something is true, neither from experience, nor from any other source; we only could be sure about is false.

Popper proposed his formula [C(h,e,b) = p(e,hb)-p(e,b)] as a way to explain in a brief and simple way his science philosophy. The two extremes (1, -1) are unattainable, just because we need that the evidence be probable in some way, and because we can never reach the truth (or be sure we reach it). If we got any number above 0, we corroborate our theory, so what the famous 0.5 lets us is to differentiate between naïve and strong falsationism. From the idea at the beginning, we can say that a naïve test is the one, which does not explain more than the trivial.

If we assume that what is called ‘scientific knowledge’ consists only of guesses or conjectures, then this assumption is sufficient for solving the problem of induction, without sacrificing empiricism; that is to say, without adopting a principle of induction and ascribing to it a priori validity. For guesses are not induced from observations (although they may, of course, be suggested to us by observations.) The key to the solution of inductions problem is the recognition that our theories, even the most important ones, and even those which are actually true, always remain conjectures. And the main points given by Popper to solve inductions problem are:

- Acceptance of the view that theories are of supreme importance
- Acceptance of Hume’s argument against induction: any hope that we may posses positive reasons for believing in our theories is destroyed by that argument
- Acceptance of the principle of empiricism scientific theories are rejected or adopted (tentatively) in the light of the results of experimental or observational tests
- Acceptance of critical rationalism: scientific theories are rejected or adopted as being better or worse than other known theories in the light of the results of rational criticism.

All this steer us to a central point in Popper’s philosophy, the problem of demarcation; and sum we can say that a method of looking for verifications, it’s a typical method of a pseudoscience, and it is clearly different and distinguishable from the method of testing a theory as severely as we can – that is, the method of criticism, the method of looking for falsifying instances.

1 comentario:

shaylito dijo...

larga vida a Popper, muerte a los programas pseudocientificos y- o mnetafisicos